Seattle University

ScholarWorks @ SeattleU
International Studies Undergraduate Honors
Theses

International Studies

2020

Plucked from History: The Removal of the Japanese Flag,
Anthem, and Imperial System from its Wartime Context (2020)
Andrew Masaru Orita
Seattle University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.seattleu.edu/intl-std-theses

Recommended Citation
Orita, Andrew Masaru, "Plucked from History: The Removal of the Japanese Flag, Anthem, and Imperial
System from its Wartime Context (2020)" (2020). International Studies Undergraduate Honors Theses. 6.
https://scholarworks.seattleu.edu/intl-std-theses/6

This Asia is brought to you for free and open access by the International Studies at ScholarWorks @ SeattleU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in International Studies Undergraduate Honors Theses by an authorized
administrator of ScholarWorks @ SeattleU.

PLUCKED FROM HISTORY

1

Seattle University

Plucked from History:
The Removal of the Japanese Flag, Anthem, and Imperial System from its Wartime Context

A Thesis Submitted to
The Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences
In Candidacy for the Degree of
Departmental Honors in International Studies

By
Andrew Masaru Orita

June 2018

PLUCKED FROM HISTORY
This honors thesis by Andrew Masaru Orita is approved
Digitally signed by Serena
Serena
Cosgrove
Date: 2020.10.23 15:23:54
Cosgrove
-07'00'
_____________________________________________

Dr. Serena Cosgrove, coordinator

_____________________________________________
Dr. Shizuko Suenaga, external reader

_____________________________________________
Dr. Enyu Zhang, external reader

Enyu Zhang

Digitally signed by Enyu Zhang
Date: 2020.10.23 16:37:18 -07'00'

2

PLUCKED FROM HISTORY

3
Abstract

The Japanese state is represented by its flag, the national anthem, and the emperor. Literature
on the history of these symbols, including their use by the fascist Japanese Empire during the
Second World War, is extensive, however, information on the impact of these symbols after the
war is sparse, especially in English. As an outlier among former Axis nations, Japan continues
to use the flag, anthem, and imperial system as national symbols similarly to the way they were
used during the war. This paper seeks to understand how these symbols became acceptable in
a nominally peaceful and democratic state. Extensive historical context from before the war to
the present is provided, giving support to a tracking of policy positions towards the flag
(hinomaru), the anthem (kimigayo), and the imperial system under the U.S. occupation of Japan
between 1945 and 1952.
Through an analysis of primary and secondary sources in both English and Japanese,
this study concludes that the U.S. government, in creating a Japanese state and people who
would support democracy and U.S. military policy in the face of the Cold War, retained the
symbols of the flag, anthem, and emperor because they were already part of a wartime united
Japanese national identity. To this end, the U.S. removed these symbols from their wartime
context in Asia and from contemporary Japanese history altogether to strengthen the U.S.Japan alliance. As a result, Japanese born after the war have been far less exposed to the true
history of their flag, anthem, and imperial system, therefore establishing a falsely constructed
popular consensus that these symbols can be justifiably used to represent the current Japanese
state despite protests from their Asian neighbors who suffered under Japanese imperialism.
Keywords: hinomaru, kimigayo, imperial system, national symbols, occupation
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Plucked from History: The Removal of the Japanese Flag, Anthem, and Imperial System
from its Wartime Context
The construction of a national identity is central to any nation wanting to be recognized
in the current world order shaped by Western 1 political traditions, which includes the
institutionalization of a flag and an anthem as national symbols (Ghenea, 2015, p. 18). As a
result of these influences, Japan, having been exposed to these Western constructions for
centuries, developed its own national identity along these lines. A newly Westernized Japanese
government then appropriated the existing rising sun flag or hinomaru (日の丸), considered one
of the most important symbols of early Japanese statehood (Field, 19991, p. 69), and the poem
kimigayo, which was transformed into a national anthem. These symbols, having become
national symbols abroad due to Japanese foreign trade and diplomatic missions, were later coopted by the fascist regime that took hold in the early 20th century alongside an imperial system
that, also inspired by Western traditions of leadership, had “transform[ed] [the emperor] into a
monarch in Western military costume” (Field, 1991, p.25). Tied to a glorification of the emperor
and the spread of Japanese colonialism, the hinomaru, kimigayo, and the imperial system
reigned over years of colonial subjugation and criminal activities in the Asia-Pacific region.
Today, despite the direct connection these symbols have to the war, all three remain the
national flag, anthem, and head of state, respectively. How this has come to be, especially when
comparing how a Germany flying the swastika would be perceived today, has not been well
explored in the existing literature, partially due to the success of U.S. efforts during the
occupation of Japan to reframe the symbols for a democratic and peaceful society. As
generations who remember how these symbols were used during the war begin to die off, there
is a concern that future generations will forget the association between these symbols and the

The primary Western powers that Japan was in contact with leading up to the Meiji Restoration included The
Netherlands, Portugal, The United Kingdom, the United States, Russia, Germany, and France (Palmer & Hein, 2016)

1
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atrocities caused by the Japanese Empire, galvanizing right-wing politicians aiming to
remilitarize Japan under these symbols. In this paper I argue that this campaign to reshape the
symbols of the hinomaru, kimigayo, and the imperial system has its origins in U.S. occupational
policy that sought to utilize these wartime symbols to rally the Japanese people in support of
American ideological and military goals in the Asia Pacific region during the Cold War. Further, I
argue that in doing so, these symbols have been successfully removed from their historical
origins and their wartime context in Asia, allowing them to become politically justified
representations of a peaceful, democratic Japanese state. This paper will briefly review the
historical literature to provide context for an in-depth analysis of U.S. occupational policy
towards the symbols of the hinomaru, kimigayo, and the imperial system. This will be followed
by an exploration of the impact that occupational policy had towards the eventual enshrinement
of the flag and the anthem into Japanese law in 1999, concluding with a summation on how the
processes of historical revisionism and the legal status of the symbols have supported the
justification of contemporary Japanese right-wing political goals.
Literature Review
Among scholars who focus on Japanese political history, there is a common recognition
of a contradiction between the liberal ideals of the Japanese constitution and the fascist-era
structures that remain central to the Japanese national identity. In short, the central symbolic
tenants of the Japanese national identity, meant to embody a peaceful, democratic state, are
the same ones that were used to represent an empire that terrorized Asia in the 20th century,
and no reconciliation on that fact has been undertaken since the war’s end. Objectively, the
existence of an imperial family and the perpetuation of imperial era names on official
government documents is antithetical to democracy (Field, 1991, p. 154). Further, the national
flag and the national anthem are both closely tied with the fascist regime that ruled prior to and
during the Second World War. Literature in both English and Japanese detail the historical
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origins of the hinomaru, kimigayo, and the imperial system and how they were affected during
the American occupation of Japan. However, many do not analyze in depth how these symbols
came to be reborn and what consequences that process has had on contemporary Japanese
and Asian politics. To provide context for this study, literature on the general function of symbols
within propaganda and national identity will be introduced, followed by literature detailing the
historical context for each of the three chosen symbols for this study.
Defining Symbols
In understanding the place of symbols in political propaganda and national identity, it is
important to have a theoretical understanding of symbols themselves. Charles A. Fleming
discussed how propaganda campaigns that use symbols target the public at a psychological
level in his article Understanding Propaganda from a General Semantics Perspective. Speaking
specifically to how people perceive the association between a national flag and an organization,
propagandists undertake a process called transferring, which he described as: “…carr[ying]
positive qualities of someone or something over to whatever the propagandist is promoting”
(1995, p. 6). The success of this model rests on the public refraining from questioning whether
the association between the symbol and the organization that uses it is merited (Fleming, 1995,
p. 7). In other words, a symbol succeeds as a representation of an organization and its goals
when the public believes that the connection between the two is justified (through history,
ideology, etc.) and when the public treats the organization with the same level of respect they
would treat the symbol.
Boris Petrović elaborated further on the topic of symbology as a propaganda tool in his
article Visual Language of World War I Propaganda on a Symbolic Plane: How a Visual Symbol
is Created. While his research focused on how religious figures were used as symbols during
World War I, Petrović suggested that a general pattern exists when well-known images and
icons are co-opted for political purposes. He argued that “[i]t is the very function of archetypes,
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in which both the icons and the posters deal in – to be universally recognizable, to stir the
emotions of the audience, to be impactful” (2016, p. 38). In line with this, the politically
westernized Japanese Empire saw the national flag, anthem, and imperial system as archetypal
symbols of their nation. Petrović continued by arguing that using symbols as propaganda allows
the ideology of the user to connect itself to the historical meaning of the symbol (Petrović, 2016,
p. 38). In this sense, symbols that already have a place in the national consciousness are apt to
be used for propaganda, as the user can equate and transfer existing popular support for the
chosen symbol to their ideology and goals.
Michael Billing developed on this base theory of symbols in his theory of banal
nationalism in his book Banal Nationalism. He described this version of nationalism 2 as the
“…ideological pattern in which ‘our’ nationalism (that of established nations…) is forgotten [and]
it ceases to appear as nationalism, disappearing into the ‘natural’ environment of ‘societies’”
(1995, p. 38). He continued, arguing that the symbols used to support the formation of a nation
state through the construction of a sovereign national identity remain even when the process of
nation building is complete (Billing, 1995, p. 41). As a result, these symbols become
manifestations of the history that led to the nation’s establishment, being used during national
celebrations and other events “…in actions which preserve collective memory without the
conscious activity of individuals remembering” (Billig, 1995, 42). However, Billig noted that this
collective memory is not necessarily constant, stating that “…national histories are continually
being re-written, and the re-writing reflects current balances of hegemony” (Billig, 1995, p. 71).
In the case of Japan, a nation whose national identity was reformed during U.S. occupation, the
decades that have passed since then have presented an opportunity for the collective memory
that is embodied in the symbols of the flag, anthem, and imperial system to be changed. In

Billing defines nationalism (for the purpose of his analysis) as “…the ideology that creates and maintains nation
states” (Billing, 1995, p. 19)

2
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analyzing that point for the purpose of this paper, it is important to understand the origins of the
symbols that make up the Japanese national identity.
The National Flag
The rising sun flag has three contemporary connotations: the current national flag, the
current Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) flag, and the current Maritime Self-Defense Force
(JMSDF) flag, displayed in Figures 1, 2, and 3 respectively. This paper will focus on the current
national flag.

Figure 1. The current Japanese national flag. Retrieved from
https://www.japan.go.jp/japan/flagandanthem/

Figure 2. The current Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force flag. Retrieved from
https://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/shiritai/flag/index.html
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Figure 3. The current Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force flag. Retrieved from
https://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/shiritai/flag/index.html
Yasutaka Teruoka described the origins of the national flag in his book, Hinomaru,
Kimigayo no naritachi [the origins of the Rising Sun Flag and the National Anthem], stating that
its use as a non-military naval insignia starting in 1870 created an association between it and
Japan, leading to the government adopting it as the Japanese national flag in the same year
(Teruoka, 1991, p. 41). However, it was not until its use leading to and during the Second World
War in occupied territories as a replacement for the local flag and as a banner leading the
military that the national flag gained its direct association with Japanese militarism and fascism
(Teruoka, 1991, p. 41).
After Japan’s loss in the Second World War, the U.S. Occupational Government (also
known as General Headquarters or GHQ) outlawed the national flag (Bix, 200, pp. 551-552).
Between the outlawing of the flag in 1945 and the implementation of the Act on National Flag
and Anthem in 1999, Japan had no national flag. Until 1999, the flag as it appears today (aside
from a slight change in color) was informally used in the same capacity that a legal national flag
would have served. Further, as Norma Fields noted in her book, In the Realm of the Dying
Emperor, the fact that Japan had no national flag was not well known among the Japanese
public, describing that: “Most citizens [did] not know that the Rising Sun [had] never been
designated the national flag, just as few remark upon Japan’s distinction among the Axis powers
in not taking steps to alter its national symbols after the war” (1991, p. 53).
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The National Anthem
Teruoka also described the origins of the Japanese national anthem, kimigayo (君が代),
in his book. He presented its origins as coming from a style of Japanese poetry known as waka,
the specific poem that the anthem came from having been written in 1013 (Teruoka, 1991, p.
44). Like the flag, exposure to the Western concepts of national identity pushed the Japanese
government to institute a national anthem (Teruoka, 1991, 56). The anthem, accompanied by a
composition by Hayashi Hiromori, came into official use in 1888 by the navy, schools, and on
public holidays. Yet, like the flag, it was not a legally established symbol of Japan (Teruoka,
1991, pp. 59-60). Unlike the hinomaru, however, the anthem was never officially outlawed by
GHQ during occupation (Bix, 2000, pp. 551-552). This was partially because it had never been
fully enshrined into law in the first place.
However, from as early as 1950 there had been efforts to replace the anthem.
Nobumasa Tanaka detailed in his book, Hinomaru, kimigayo no sengoshi [The Postwar History
of the Flag and the Anthem], that a new composition, titled midori no sanga (緑の山河), spoke of
Japan in a markedly postwar sense, highlighting the emergence of a democratic and peaceful
Japan (2000, pp. 46-47). Ultimately, this new proposal was not able to stir the same level of
emotion in the Japanese people, possibly because kimigayo, while outlawed, was never actively
purged from the Japanese national identity, leaving many Japanese to continue to see it as their
anthem. As a result, no replacement anthem was ever adopted, allowing kimigayo to remain in
use, later being made the official national anthem in 1999 (Tanaka, 2000, p. 53).
The Imperial System
According to Japanese mythology, the imperial system has existed for thousands of
years, but its current iteration as a modern, Westernized system of monarchy has only been in
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place since the Meiji Restoration in 1868. Masako Shibata described in her book, Japan and
Germany under the U.S. Occupation: A Comparative Analysis of the Post-War Education
Reform, that during the early years after Emperor Meiji was established as the head of state, the
government introduced pro-imperial ideology into the education system via two monikers:
fukoku-kyōhei (富国強兵), meaning “enrich the nation and strengthen the military” and sonno-joi
(尊王攘夷), meaning “expel the barbarians and revere the emperor,” to instill allegiance to the
emperor among the public (Shibata, 2005, p. 8).
During the Second World War, as Herbert P. Bix detailed in his book Hirohito and the
Making of Modern Japan, Emperor Hirohito reaped the benefits of a public educated to believe
the emperor was divine, as the hegemonic ideology (albeit right-wing even during the war) was
that “Japan was a ‘peer-less nation’ led by a divine, precious, august ruler” (Bix, 2000, p. 289).
Bix noted that, even after Japan lost the war and occupation began in a politically purged Japan,
“…most Japanese politicians, with the notable exception of the Communists and a few
iconoclasts, however, still held the monarchy in reverential awe” (Bix, 2000, p. 570). In response
to this lingering sentiment, the U.S. policy towards the emperor developed to position him as a
constitutional, symbolic monarch who would be a spiritual center for the Japanese people
through the process of democratization (Bix, 2000, p. 579)
Methods
Research for this project was conducted through analysis of primary and secondary
sources in both English in Japanese. Scholarly articles were sourced in English only, while
books, government reports, and news articles in both languages were used.
Construction of a Wartime National Identity through Symbols
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Part of the rationale behind introducing these symbols as being representative of a
westernized Japan came from the statesman Itou Hirobumi’s perception of Japan at the time, in
which he “…lamented the absence of an indigenous belief system adequate to providing the
psychic fuel and discipline necessary to hurtle [Japanese] society into a Western-style
modernity overnight” (Field, 1991, p. 25). This shows that Japan, exposed to the threat of
Western encroachment like that seen in China during the late 19th century, felt the need to adapt
to Western norms of governance and national identity in order to fit into the greater world order
on equal terms. Therefore, the Meiji restoration re-imagined the existing imperial system along
Western lines by ‘restoring’ the emperor and the court as the main governing body of the
country and as the head of state, together with the flag and anthem that would both be central to
the emerging imperial Japanese national identity.
As a result, one of the key reasons why the symbols of the hinomaru, kimigayo, and the
imperial system were retained and used by GHQ and the sovereign Japanese state was that
they had been part of the Japanese educational curriculum and, in turn, the central (and official)
symbols of the Japanese national identity for decades. Field illustrated the value in using
symbols perpetuated through education for political purposes, stating that “[c]lassrooms are
sites for ensuring cooperation in the future. Police enforce it in the present” (Field, 1991, p. 187).
The hinomaru and kimigayo were made part of the Japanese school curriculum in 1893 during a
period of larger educational reform (Itoh, 2001, para. 9). Additionally, many schools had shrinelike hōanden (奉安殿) that housed portraits of the imperial family, towards which students were
made to bow as they entered school property (Field, 1991, p. 158). These policies also sought
to unify the Japanese state around the idea of a national family or kokka (国家) that placed the
emperor on the top as father of the nation with the Japanese public, functioning within the
entrenched social hierarchy of family as children, revering him as such (Muta, 1996, p. 107).
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The success of these symbols becoming part of the publicly believed Japanese national
identity is clear in the ability of adults raised during that time to remember specific exercises
taught to them during elementary school. One poignant example of this is the Imperial Rescript 3,
which was a declaration of the national ideology that students were made to memorize
beginning in 1890 (Field, 1991, p. 69). Even in old age, many adults were still able to recite the
rescript (Field, 1991, p. 70). The spread of imperialist ideology, however, was not limited to the
classroom. There existed education units in the Japanese Imperial Army whose job it was to
maintain the belief among soldiers that they must die for the emperor (Field, 1991, p. 178).
Given the lingering effects of the education system and its breadth before GHQ purged it of
militarist and ultra-nationalist sentiment during occupation (The General Staff of General
MacArthur, 1966, p. 80), the adult population in the immediate postwar era was one imbibed
with god-like admiration for the emperor and deep respect for the hinomaru and kimigayo,
staples of the Japanese imperial national identity, presenting an opportunity for GHQ to use that
sentiment to their benefit.
U.S. Occupational Policy and the Japanese Response
Early Days of Occupation and the Emperor Problem
The original U.S. occupational policy was “to prevent Japan from again becoming a
menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world” and “to bring about the
eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights

The Imperial Rescript was established by Emperor Meiji in 1879 as an “official statement of national morality”
(Nolte & Hajime, 1983, p. 284). This national morality was developed to “illuminate a fore fundamental unity” for
the Japanese people, that being that “the authority of the Emperor was to be used to guide his subjects’ social
behaviors outside the structure of the constitution and the law” (Nolte & Hajime, 1983, pp. 284-205).
While inherently peaceful, though it promoted a deification of the emperor, it was noted that “by the
1930s, its assertion of Japanese virtues had become welded to a paradigm which scorned other nations as morally
inferior” (Nolte & Hajime, 1983, p. 284). To this extend the Imperial Rescript served a purpose during the war to
support via education that the Japanese were justified in their colonial activities since they were imposing superior
Japanese rule on the inferior peoples of Asia.

3
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of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations” (U.S. Department of State, 1946, p. 10). In short,
GHQ sought to demilitarize and democratize Japan in a way that established them as an
American ally. In doing so, GHQ had to devise a strategy to utilize existing political structures to
support the transition from fascism to democracy. General MacArthur, the head of GHQ,
regarded that, on the occasion of Emperor Hirohito’s public broadcast of surrender, “[t]he
Japanese received the victors submissively following the Emperor’s mandate” (The General
Staff of General MacArthur, 1966, p. 51). While all three symbols of the hinomaru, kimigayo,
and the imperial system had the potential to rally the Japanese around the American cause,
GHQ found the greatest potential in the emperor.
U.S. occupational policy adviser Edwin Reischauer believed that retaining the emperor
and the imperial system held two benefits for GHQ’s mission: it would lessen Japanese
communist influence domestically and would prevent either the USSR or China from
establishing themselves as new regional powers by avoiding a power vacuum during the
transition from empire to nation-state (Shibata, 2005, p. 64). Reischauer’s personal position on
the matter became the official U.S. stance, as the occupation strategy paper presented to
President Truman in 1949 explicitly stated that occupational policy must “…make every effort to
see that the political and economic progress in Japan is such as to demonstrate the advantages
of close association with the United States and our ability as a democracy to deal with the
[development and security] problems in Asia.” (Cha, 2007, p. 115). As a result, the process of
political and structural purging after the end of World War II was, compared to Germany, less
severe. While many of the top military and government officials (except, controversially, the
emperor himself) were tried and sentenced in an international tribunal, much of the wartime
bureaucratic system remained intact to preserve a functioning government that GHQ could mold
(Dujarric, 2013, para. 5).
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Another key actor in the development of GHQ policy that preferred the preservation of
the symbols, specifically the emperor, was Joseph Grew. The former ambassador to Japan, he
led the ‘Japan group’ in the State Department (as opposed to the ‘China group’) that sought to
“…avoid direct criticism of the emperor while debunking ‘emperor worship,’ the doctrines of
State Shinto, and the kokutai 4 myth” (Moore & Robinson, 2002, p. 23-24). However, all the
policy proposals from both Reischauer and Grew fell upon the discretion of General MacArthur,
the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. MacArthur, while sharing the same position
towards the emperor as Grew, had his own goals for occupation, specifically that “…of
advancing Christianity in Japan and his conviction that the emperor would cooperate in that
effort” (Moore & Robinson, 2002, 38). Therefore, MacArthur’s role in saving the symbols of the
imperial Japanese national identity, especially the emperor, should be seen both as an exercise
of his goals and as key to the survival of the symbols. In 1946, the Australians sought to convict
the emperor of war crimes, but it was MacArthur’s pleas to Washington that were able to
pressure the Australians (via the British) to give up their claim (Moore & Robinson, 2002, 48).
As a result, MacArthur is seen by historians as having “…played a key role in saving Emperor
Hirohito from forced abdication and a humiliating international trial for war crimes” ((Moore &
Robinson, 2002, 49).
The Imperial “Victory Tours”
The three symbols of the hinomaru, kimigayo, and the imperial system were all part of
the former Imperial state structure and were later manipulated to rally the Japanese people
around U.S. occupational policy goals. The specific U.S. policy concerning the emperor,
codenamed Operation Blacklist, was designed to separate Emperor Hirohito from militarists,

Kokutai (国体) was a Japanese political ideology that rejected the earlier system of constitutional monarchy in
favor of a “…theory that the Emperor was the essence of the State and that all Japanese people held a relationship
to the Kami [gods] of Shinto religion and to the Emperor through the Kami” (Goodman, 2071, p. 22)

4
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turn him into a constitutional monarch, and have him remain a center point for the spiritual
transition from fascism to democracy since “…the emperor was crucial to ensuring control over
the population” (Bix, 2000, p. 545). This plan was partially in response to a growing discourse
between the Allied powers who participated in the Pacific War and within Japanese politics
itself, especially among Japanese Christian elites, one being Prime Minister Katayama Tetsu,
who supported MacArthur’s position of not indicting the emperor (Moore & Robinson, 2002, p.
39), over the war responsibility of the emperor. GHQ, having “…come around [to the emperor]
once he had demonstrated… his incredible power to secure a smooth surrender of millions of
Japanese troops throughout the Asia-Pacific region,” strongly advocated for the retention of the
emperor (Bix, 1992, p. 316). During the Tokyo Trials, an international tribunal that convicted
several high-ranking Japanese military and government officials for war crimes, GHQ and
Japanese moderates and conservatives pushed the narrative that the emperor was passive
during the war, while other Allied nations, specifically Australia, continued efforts to indict the
emperor and hold him equally responsible for Japanese atrocities that occurred during the war
(Bix, 1992, p. 322). Domestically, the Japanese Communist Party openly blamed the emperor
for the war (Bix, 1992, 305). MacArthur, in response, stated that “no specific and tangible
evidence has been uncovered with regard to the emperor’s exact activities which might connect
him with the political decisions of the Japanese Empire during the last decade” (Bix, 1992, 332),
cementing the U.S. and larger Allied position that the emperor was not to be seen as a war
criminal, rather as a symbol of an institution, perverted by militarism, that still held the spiritual
influence necessary to unify the Japanese people around democracy.
To that end, GHQ sent the emperor out on a series of tours in 1947 meant to bring the
ephemeral figure of the emperor down to earth, showing that he was a human being on par with
his subjects. However, journalists covering these events noted that these visits appeared like
“victory tours” where “the banned sun flag flew from the rooftops and was waved by thousands
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of cheering welcomers” (Bix, 2000, p. 625). Further, those who waited to see the emperor
continued to greet him with the banzai (万歳) chant, similar to “long live the king,” and treated
him with the same adoration they had when he was the absolute leader of the nation (Bix, 2000,
p. 629). The emperor’s visit to Hiroshima is one of the most reflective instances of how central
the emperor remained to the national consciousness after the war, as there was an “organized
widespread display of the flag” even as the tour coincided with the anniversary of the attack on
Pearl Harbor (Bix, 2000, p. 631). It appeared that, despite the potential the emperor and the
associated symbol of the flag had to unite the nation around democratic principles, these tours
and the lack of enforcement of the flag ban increased “the power and influence of the Imperial
tradition,” instead of democratizing the monarchy (Bix, 2000, p. 631). However, the emperor’s
support for GHQ policy goals towards demilitarization and democratization was justification
enough for the U.S. to conduct occupational policy through the emperor and the other symbols
of the wartime Japanese national identity.
Censorship
While policy towards the de-deification of the emperor and the banning of the hinomaru
lacked teeth, GHQ, in partnership with the postwar Japanese government, conducted a
widespread censorship campaign that supported the U.S. perception of the war in the Japanese
media. The Civilian Censorship Detachment oversaw efforts to prevent any press that “might
invite mistrust or resentment of [GHQ and Allied forces]” (The General Staff of General
MacArthur, 1966, 236). This process, together with GHQ’s larger goals involving the emperor,
created a narrative that separated the emperor from those convicted from his former cabinet by
the international tribunal to shape the emperor into a new symbol for Japanese spiritual unity
towards democracy, void of any war responsibility (Bix, 1992, pp. 331-332). However, even the
narrative of the emperor as no longer a deity lacked consistency, allowing the wartime
perception of the emperor to persist. This is best seen in the policies used when referring to the
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emperor in newspapers during occupation. Before and during the war, specific honorifics, a
grammatical feature common in some Asian languages including Japanese, were reserved for
members of the imperial family (Akimoto-Sugimori, 2013, p. 177). Censorship guidelines after
the war then sought to target two main propagandic issues: “Divine Descent Nation
Propoganda” and “Nationalist Propaganda” (Akimoto-Sugimori, 2013, p. 180). Since referring to
the emperor in a god-like fashion via honorifics is representative of both, editors had to readjust
and censor themselves when writing about the activities of the imperial family after the war
(Akimoto-Sugimori, 2013, p. 182). However, because the decision of what was considered
propaganda or not was subjective, the level to which honorific language was reduced was
irregular between each individual editor (Akimoto-Sugimori, 2013, p. 190). Specifically, while
some individual censors believed that imperial honorifics were deleted in all types of media
(Akimoto-Sugimori, 2013, p. 182), many articles that passed censorship regulations still retained
the imperial honorifics of o/go (both written as 御) and sasu/tamau (さす・たまう), the former of
which, when using the Chinese character, harks back to the way the actions of the Imperial
family were detailed during the war in print media (Akimoto-Sugimori, 2013, p. 184). The lack of
consensus among editors reflects a low level of concern on the part of GHQ to enforce the dedeification policy towards the emperor, in part because the legacy of the god-emperor
perception was central to the image of the emperor GHQ used to guide the Japanese to
democracy.
Occupation Policy Shift
The advancement of the Cold War, especially in Korea, prompted the U.S. to change
course in how Japan would be crafted as a regional ally. Initially, the policy was to disarm Japan
and prevent it from waging war (a value currently enshrined in the Japanese Constitution).
However, in 1948 the National Security Council approved “the shift in U.S. occupation policy
from political democratization to economic reconstruction and remilitarization” (Bix, 2000, p.
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635). This shift was coined as the beta strategy of occupation; as opposed to an alpha strategy
of complete disarmament and a gamma strategy of immediate rearmament, the beta strategy
“sought to craft and temper Japan’s postwar recovery in the context of the [U.S.] alliance” (Cha,
2007, p. 116). As a result, GHQ was asked to assist Japan in not only developing “appropriate
military forces” but also in developing “low-cost military material for use in Japan and in other
noncommunist countries in Asia” (Cha, 2007, p. 116). These efforts required mass mobilization
of the former Japanese war machine. GHQ saw that the symbols of the hinomaru, kimigayo,
and the imperial system were best suited to support this revitalization.
Like before the policy shift, GHQ continued to promote information that separated not
only national symbols from their wartime connections, but Japan as a state from its fascist past.
Part of this process came from a unilateral occupation of Japan by the Americans as opposed to
a partitioned occupation by all the allied forces (China, specifically). This allowed the U.S. to
emphasize the 1941-1945 war between Japan and the U.S. over the longer war between Japan
and Asia that started in 1931 (Conrad, 2003, p. 91). As a result, the imperialist occupation of
Asia – where the hinomaru and kimigayo supplanted any existing national symbology and the
emperor was made the ultimate leader – was pushed to the sidelines to the point that the
terminology in Japanese for the war shifted from the Great East Asian War (大東亜戦争) to the
Pacific War (太平洋戦争) (Conrad, 2003, p. 91). This repainting of Japan battling with a great
Western power, instead of several Asian powers, was part of a larger ideological shift known as
datsu-a (脱亜) or de-Asianization. This process, originally coined during the Meiji Restoration,
aimed to place Japan’s history within the greater context of Western history, taking it out of any
Asian context, to support the newly formed alliance between Japan and the U.S., but more
broadly with the noncommunist West (Conrad, 2003, p. 92).
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After the policy shift in 1948, the emperor’s own disposition became a tool to unite the
people around him towards supporting the new U.S. policy goals. In bringing the emperor down
from being a deity to a human being, the postwar Japanese public were able to sympathize with
him. This allowed for a sort of continued deification of the emperor as a representation of the
Japanese people, as “the affirmative sense of having worked hard and suffered harshly together
with the emperor” permeated the mindset of many who would work to advance the U.S. Cold
War strategic plans in Japan (Bix, 2000, pp. 638-639).
Constructing A Post-Occupational National Identity
The end of occupation in 1952 allowed the Japanese government to take full control
over the aspects of society that GHQ had been shaping to support U.S. interests. The potency
of the American effort to reinstate the symbols of the hinomaru, kimigayo, and the imperial
system showed in their continued and increased use after occupation ended. Starting in 1952,
the National Memorial Service for War Dead (全国戦没者追悼式) was instituted where, upon the
arrival of the emperor, kimigayo was played (Bix, 2000, pp. 652-653). Additionally, the use of
the hinomaru and kimigayo to celebrate national holidays was stated as desirable (望ましい)
from 1950 onwards, with additional government decrees expanding the desired (implying
expected) use of the flag and the anthem during public events (Teruoka, 1991, p. 5). While
these policies were instituted during a period of sovereignty in Japanese governance, treaties
between the U.S. and Japan maintained the de-Asianization of Japan’s political activities,
allowing an independent Japan to use these symbols without accountability to other Asian
nations in the region, like South Korea and the Philippines, who were also under the U.S.
defense umbrella. The next section will analyze the nature of the Treaty of San Francisco,
specifically as it relates to de-Asianization, and the political influence of the hinomaru, kimigayo,
and imperial system in post-occupation Japan.
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The Treaty of San Francisco
The Treaty of San Francisco, signed in 1951 and ratified in 1952, officially ended the
occupation of Japan and established the State of Japan as a sovereign nation. However, while
several nations were joint signatories, the nations that were excluded from the treaty process
reflect the continued de-Asianization of not only Japan’s past, but its present. Notably, the
United States barred representatives from both North and South Korea and those from the
People’s Republic China and the Republic of China from the treaty negotiations due to both a
lack of consensus over which governments represented the people of Korea and China and a
fear of increased communist influence in the proceedings (Price, 2001, p. 56). Yukiko Koshiro, a
scholar on American-East Asian relations, stated that the exclusion of these nations from the
treaty of San Francisco allowed Japan to “preserve – and resume under the Cold War sanction
of the United States – its presumption of superiority over other Asians. Also, Japan’s racist
wartime ideology, which had propelled atrocities against Asian soldiers and civilians alike,
escaped scrutiny and condemnation” (Price, 2001, p. 45). This separation of Japan from its
responsibility during the war with Asia was further cemented through the legal determination of
war responsibility as stated in the treaty, which established Japan’s liability for damages to
Allied property as only being viable from December 7th, 1941 (Pearl Harbor) onward (Price,
2001, p. 37). This period of time omits the wars in China starting in 1931 and the occupation of
Korea and Taiwan that had been in effect for decades preceding the Second World War,
ultimately shielding Japan from any legal responsibility and responsibility for reparations (in the
eyes of the signatories) for the atrocities that occurred in these colonized territories. This, in
part, gave a degree of international support to the retention of Japan’s wartime national symbols
as being unassociated with war crimes in Asia.
Impact of the 1999 Act on National Flag and Anthem
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1999, the year the Act on National Flag and Anthem was passed, marked a pivotal
moment for the hinomaru and kimigayo. The persistence of the government to implement the
flag and anthem back into schools as they had been during the Meiji era and the war, part of a
larger conservative agenda under the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), demonstrated that
the government was “…concerned with regaining Japan’s national confidence and identity, lost
in the defeat in World War II” (Itoh, 2001, para. 35). At the time the bill was submitted to the
National Diet, Japan’s legislature, the public was largely supportive of the measure, with roughly
70 percent of the Japanese population in support of their reinstatement as the national flag and
anthem (Itoh, 2001, para. 12). This high level of support came in part from about 60 percent
believing, at the time, that the hinomaru and kimigayo were already the legal national flag and
anthem (Itoh, 2001, para. 13). The public support for the bill emboldened the right in Japanese
politics, specifically Nippon Kaigi (日本会議), a right-wing political lobby whose membership
includes many members of the LDP, including current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who were the
main drivers behind the 1999 act’s submission to the Diet (Pletnia, 2017, p. 179).
In the years following the act’s adoption, the LDP looked to solidify the symbols as part
of the Japanese national identity through the constitution, as they developed a new draft of the
document in 2012 that “…adapt[ed] wording that put the emperor in the place of sovereign and
intoduce[d] a new article that officially declare[d] nisshōki [another term for the hinomaru] and
kimigayo as flag and anthem” (Pletnia, 2017, 185). In doing so, it is argued by Maciej Pletnia in
his article Back to the Past: Analysis of the Amendemnts Regarding Emperor and the National
Symbols in the LDP 2012 Constitutional Draft that “[t]he authors of the draft may have intended
to present contemporary Japan as a symbolic continuation of the pre-war state” (Pletnia, 2017,
p. 185) and that there was “…a desire to reinterpret the country’s past and thereby reconstruct
its collective memory” (Pletnia, 2017, p. 191-192). These strong positions taken by the
Japanese right in reinstituting these symbols as a way to connect the current Japanese state
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with the former Japanese empire and its predecessor states by “…present[ing] the flag and
anthem as positive symbols of Japan’s success while forgetting their negative connotations”
(Pletnia, 2017, p. 190) shows that the 1999 act and its public support has emboldened their
ideology. In short, the act has helped legitimize these symbols as official representations of the
Japanese national identity and, in using them to support their political goals, legitimize policies,
like remilitarization and historical revisionism, among the Japanese right that may be seen by
some as antithetical to Japan’s commitment to peace and democracy.
In recent years, however, the Japanese government has begun to face criticism on its
use of the flag, anthem, and the imperial system as tools in the government’s campaign of
historical revisionism. This has come primarily from China and South Korea, but domestic
criticism has also increased. This rise in condemnation has emerged for a specific reason – the
wartime generation is beginning to die out (Conrad, 2003, p. 95). The fear of the Japanese
version of history becoming the hegemonic view on these symbols and on Japanese history in
general is pushing new generations of activists to protest the flag, anthem, and the emperor.
This fear is perpetuated by the U.S. holding bilateral security treaties and agreements with
Japan and its neighbors instead of a wider Asia-Pacific alliance, diplomatically defending Japan
from its critics. This has allowed Japan to “…appear so confident of Washington’s backing that it
willfully disregards Allied prisoner of war suffering during the Second World War, just as it
dismisses the pain endured by the Koreans [and other colonized Asian peoples]” (Dudden,
2019, para. 7). A specific instance of this is found in a conservative South Korean politician who,
in 2019, proposed that the rising sun flag used by the Maritime Self-Defense Force (see Figure
2) should be banned in public spaces in South Korea (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet,
2013, para. 1). Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga remarked that “[c]laims that
the flag is an expression of political assertions or a symbol of militarism are absolutely false. It
appears to me that this is a large misunderstanding” (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet,
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2013, para. 2). The press release of this statement, available in English, Korean, and Japanese,
is attached to a short presentation that shows the rising sun flag’s historical context (omitting
any mention of colonization and the Second World War) and instances of its use by the JMSDF
at ports in China and South Korea, both of which are formerly occupied territories (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2019). The information campaign being conducted by the Japanese
government, once limited to the domestic sphere, has now begun to branch out internationally
to substantiate the Japanese claim that the hinomaru, kimigayo, and the imperial system are
justifiable national symbols for a liberal, peaceful Japan.
Conclusion
The symbols of the hinomaru, kimigayo, and the imperial system are all factually
representative of a period in Japanese history where they reigned over colonial invasions and
atrocities throughout the Asia Pacific region. However, within the Western expectations of
national identity, having these symbols remains a necessity for the Japanese state. Without a
flag, some argue, the Japanese people would be seen in the West as simply Asian (Teruoka,
1991, p. 42). These symbols had existed before the Second World War and are objectively nonmilitarist in nature. The short number of years during which they represented the Japanese
imperialist regime have, however, irreversibly poisoned them (Teruoka, 1991, p. 42).
Regardless, the U.S. government believed that the benefits of using these symbols to unite the
Japanese people towards democracy and later Cold War military support during occupation
outweighed the consequences of stripping these symbols of their wartime associations. Once
Japan gained independence over its domestic governance in 1952, the symbols came back into
use similarly to the way they had been used during the war. While some may argue that the
sovereignty of the Japanese state implies that the development of the symbols into a national
identity after 1952 were not under the influence of the U.S., the Japanese government was able
to disregard their militarist and imperialist implications thanks to a structure of U.S. diplomatic
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support, one avenue being the Treaty of San Francisco, that, together with U.S.-Japan defense
treaties, continues to protects the Japanese position from critics in the Asia-Pacific region that
were previously under Japanese imperial rule. As a result, in addition to the passing of the 1999
Act, right-wing politics in Japan have become emboldened in their efforts to remilitarize Japan
and reshape Japanese history. Today, the scrutinization of these symbols is increasing as those
who remember what the flag, anthem, and emperor stood for during the war are beginning to
die off (Conrad, 2003, p. 95). New generations of activists, both in and outside Japan, are now
responsible for holding the Japanese state accountable for their continued use and support of
these symbols. This prompts the possibility of future research that examines how the current
young generations in Japan, who can access historical information via the internet (i.e. outside
of the government-sponsored education curriculum) perceive these symbols in order to
determine whether the campaign to erase the history of the hinomaru, kimigayo, and the
imperial system has been successful.
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